Effective Eavesdropping to Twin Field Quantum Key Distribution by Wang, Xiang-Bin et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
02
27
2v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
6 M
ay
 20
18
Effective Eavesdropping to Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution
Xiang-Bin Wang,1,2,4
∗†
Xiao-Long Hu1,and Zong-Wen Yu3
1State Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Physics, Department of Physics,
Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, Peoples Republic of China
2 Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China
Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
3Data Communication Science and Technology Research Institute, Beijing 100191, China
4 Jinan Institute of Quantum technology, SAICT, Jinan 250101, Peoples Republic of China
We present an effective Eavesdropping scheme to attack the twin-field protocol of quantum key
distribution (TF-QKD) proposed recently (M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes and A. J. Shields,
Nature, 2018). After carrying out our scheme, Eve will have full information of all bit values due to
signal fields without causing any noise. In such a case, the actual secure key rate is 0 but the existing
protocol of TF-QKD will present a key rate of 50% from raw key to final key. This shows that the
existing protocol of TF-QKD is supposed to be further studied so as to see whether its security can
be improved to a satisfactory level. In view of this security problem of the TF-QKD, the 4-intensity
optimized protocol of measurement-device-independent QKD (Phy. Rev. A 93, 042324 (2016) ) is
still the one that can present the longest secure distance of QKD on the Earth.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] can be used for
secure private communication in principle. But in prac-
tice, there can be security loopholes due to device imper-
fection. Since the concept of measurement device inde-
pendent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD)[3,4] was
proposed, the fatal security threaten of detection attack
[5] was thoroughly resolved. Actually, the MDI-QKD is
secure even though Eve. completely controls the channel
and the measurement station. Later, many efforts were
made to improve the practical feasibility of MDI-QKD[6-
17]. In particular, Ref.[6] for the first time present the op-
erable method for the decoy-state MDI-QKD with finite
intensities so that the protocol is experimentally oper-
able in practice[7]. The theoretical method in Ref.[13]
can hugely improve the key rate and secure distance.
There, it proposes to use the 4-intensity optimization
protocol with joint constraints and economic worst-case
analysis. This method [13] has been experimentally ver-
ified extensively[14-17]. Specifically, using this method,
a secure distance of 404km was experimentally demon-
strated[15]. This is the longest secure distance of QKD
on the earth.
Very recently, the twin-field quantum key distribution
(TF-QKD)[18] was proposed with a claim of over 500km
accessible distance. However, as was stated in [18], the
security proof is not completed because in the protocol
Alice and Bob will have to announce the phase informa-
tion of their pulses, this does not meet the condition of
the decoy-state method[6,19,20,21]. Here we show that
Eve. can indeed attack the TF-QKD effectively by mak-
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ing use of the phase information announced by Alice and
Bob after the measurement and classical communication
as requested by the protocol. In what follows, we shall
first review the main ideas of the TF-QKD and Eaves-
dropping in Section II, and then present our Eavesdrop-
ping scheme in Section III. After that we show details of
the consequence of our Eavesdropping scheme in Section
IV and finally we conclude our paper in Section V.
II. MAIN IDEA OF TF-QKD AND
EAVESDROPPING
Similar to the measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution(MDI-QKD)[3,4], in the twin-field
quantum key distribution (TF-QKD)[18], Alice and Bob
sends field to the un-trusted third party Charlie. MDI-
QKD is secure even Eve controls the whole channel and
Charlie. In and virtual protocol, Alice and Bob ini-
tially shares single-photon entangled states of |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉). Alice and Bob will do a phase shift of
either 0 or pi and they will send their fields to Char-
lie. After a collective measurement, Charlie will see
whether the single-photon bipartite state is |ψ+〉 or
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). Although this information is
announced publicly, no one knows which value, 0 or pi
was selected by Alice or Bob in doing their phase shift,
although it is known to everyone whether Alice and Bob
has used the same phase shift or different phase shift.
However, in a real TF-QKD protocol, we do not have
such an initially shared states. The TF-QKD proposed
to use weak coherent states at each side. In what follows
we show that the TF-QKD is actually unsecure if Eve
controls the whole channel and Charlie. As it is stated in
Ref[18], the security proof of TF-QKD is not completed
because it has not considered the influence to security
of the final announcement of the random phase values
2FIG. 1: Schematic protocol of TF-QKD proposed by [18].
This picture is taken from Ref.[18]
taken by Alice and Bob. In our proposed Eavesdropping
scheme, we make use of this and Eve. does operations
after the announcement. Also, before that, in doing the
interference measurement, Eve. uses crude measurement
which only collapses the light beams into two subspaces,
vacuum or non-vacuum. If a beam is collapsed to non-
vacuum subspaces, it is a linear superposition of different
Fock state and it keeps the phase difference of different
photon-number states. Also, Eve. will engineer this non-
vacuum linear superposed state by non-trace-preserving
maps. If she obtains the outcome she wants, she will an-
nounce to Alice and Bob she has obtained a count and
stores the outcome light state. If she has not obtained
the outcome she wants, she just pretends that she has
not detected anything. After the random phase shift val-
ues taken earlier by Alice and Bob are announced, Eve
does projective measurement to her stored light state cor-
responding to the signal fields again and the outcome
presents deterministically all bit information.
Recall the TF-QKD protocol in Fig.[1]. The proto-
col post selects those events whose random phases taken
by Alice and Bob are in the same slice. In the limit of
very small slice, only those pulse pairs with same random
phases will be post selected. For simplicity, we shall only
consider such a case. Or equivalently, we shall consider
an ideal protocol where Alice and Bob always take the
identical random phase shifts, corresponding to infinitely
small phase slices in [18]. We shall only consider such an
”ideal TF-QKD protocol”. We assume that there is no
operational or detection errors.
III. EAVESDROPPING SCHEME
We list the Eavesdropping scheme to each pulse pairs
from Alice and Bob in the following:
Step 0. Consider Fig.1. Before the twin pulses enter the
beam splitter, Eve.(Charlie) just honestly does whatever
as requested by the the TF-QKD protocol.
Step 1. Eve. only takes crude detection at the measure-
ment phase after a pulse pair passes the beam splitter
in Fig.1. Say, if detector D0 or D1 counts, it means the
the corresponding output beam has been collapsed to the
Fock space without vacuum. But Eve. does not imme-
diately announce her detected result as requested by the
protocol at this moment. She put off her announcement
until the end of Step 4 in the attacking scheme. This is
the key point of the attacking scheme. If she obtains vac-
uum, she stops the attacking and she will announce that
she has detected nothing for the corresponding incident
pulse pair from Alice and Bob at the end of Step 4; and
if she obtains non-vacuum, she stores the detected state
|χ〉 and continue the attacking scheme.
Remark: Consider the beam at any output port of the
beamsplitter. Given a linear superposed state in the form∑∞
k=0 ak|k〉 just before it comes into the corresponding
detector. If the detector counts then, the outcome state
becomes into
|χ〉 = N
∞∑
k=1
ak|k〉, (1)
where N is the normalization factor.
Step 2. Eve takes a crude measurement to project the
stored state |χ〉 either to the subspace S = {|1〉, |2〉} or
to the subspace S˜ = {|3〉, |4〉, |5〉 · · · }. If the outcome
is S˜, she stops attacking and she will announce that she
has detected nothing for the corresponding incident pulse
pair from Alice and Bob at the end of Step 4; and if
the outcome is S, she stores the state and continues her
attacking scheme.
Remark: If she obtains subspace S, the stored state
has become to
|χ2〉 = 1√|a1|2 + |a2|2
(a1|1〉+ a2|2〉). (2)
Step 3. Eve. takes the following unitary transformation
to her stored state:
U1 :


|1〉 → √µ|1〉+√1− µ|m0〉
|2〉 → |2〉
(3)
where µ is the intensity of signal state pulse in the TF-
QKD protocol and |m0〉 is a state orthogonal to both |1〉
and |2〉.
Remark: Same with all existing decoy-state protocol,
the intensities of all signal pulses and decoy pulses are
determined prior to the protocol and they are all known
to Eve.
Step 4. Eve. takes crude measurement to the stored
state after Step 3 and the state will be collapsed to ei-
ther state |m0〉 or the subspace S spanned by the Fock
states {|1〉, |2〉} as introduced in Step 2. If she obtains
|m0〉, she stops attacking and she announces that she
has detected nothing; and if she obtains subspace S, she
stores the state and announces which detector (D0 or
D1) has counted.
Remark: After step 4, the stored state is
|χ4〉 = N4(a1√µ|1〉+ a2|2〉). (4)
Step 5. After Alice and Bob announce the information
3of their random phase shift, bases of each pulse pairs,
and which pulses are decoy pulses and which pulses are
signal pulses, Eve. takes a phase shift operation and
her stored state is changed into the following state if the
corresponding incident pulse pair is a signal pair
|χ5〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 ± |2〉). (5)
depending on the the relative phase between a1 and a2.
This enables Eve. to know the bit value for sure with-
out causing any noise. does a projective measurement
to those stored states corresponding to signal pulse pairs
and she will be sure the corresponding bit values. We
can see details in the following section.
IV. STATE EVOLUTION ALONG WITH
EAVESDROPPING
Charlie’s beam splitter performs a unitary transforma-
tion in the form(Fig.1):
UBS :


a† → (a† + b†)/√2
b† → (a† − b†)/√2
(6)
In our paper we shall always define modes a or b by
propagation direction. In the figure we have assumed the
incident mode from Alice’s side to be mode a, and the
one from Bob’s side to be mode b.
Define the coherent state |α〉 = e−|α|2/2∑∞k=0 α
k√
k!
|k〉.
Given the beamsplitter defined above, any incident pulse
pair in the two-mode coherent state of the form |α〉a| −
α〉b, detector D0 is the only one that can count. Also, if
the incident pulse pair is in the two-mode coherent state
of the form |α〉a|α〉b, detector D1 is the only one that
can count. Here the different subscripts (a, b) indicate
different modes. (And later for simplicity we shall omit
the subscripts and we always use the first ket for mode
a and the second ket for mode b. ) Eve.’s task is, in
the case that detector D0 or D1 counts, if the incident
pulse pair in Step 1 is a signal pair, what is the corre-
sponding bit value ? We consider the case that detector
D0 counts at Step 1 of Eavesdropping scheme. If the
corresponding incident pulse pair before passing through
the beamsplitter was a signal pair (in Z basis), we have
|α| = √µ and the corresponding state of the beam pair
incident to Charlie’s beamsplitter in Step 1 can be either
|ψ〉 = |√µeiρ〉| − √µeiρ〉 (7)
for bit value 0 or
|ψ′〉 = | − √µeiρ〉|√µeiρ〉 (8)
for bit value 1. Here ρ is the random phase shift taken
earlier by Alice and Bob. Note that the strong reference
light is with Eve., we have just set the phase of reference
light to be 0 for simplicity. We can easily calculate the
time evolution of each states. For the evolution of state
|ψ〉 (or |ψ′〉), we use notation |ψi〉 (or |ψ′i〉) for the non-
vacuum state stored by Eve. at the end of Step i of
Eavesdropping scheme. Also, since the output mode a
(the output mode at the side of detector D1 ) is always
vacuum, we only consider time evolution of the output
port mode b (the one at the side of detector D0). Given
the incident state |ψ〉, we have the following states for its
time evolution at each stages:
|ψ1〉 = N1(|
√
2µeiρ〉 − e−2µ|0〉 = N1
∞∑
k=1
(
√
2µeiρ)k√
k!
|k〉;
(9)
|ψ2〉 = N2(
√
2µeiρ|1〉+√2µe2iρ|2〉); (10)
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉+ eiρ|2〉). (11)
All parameters N1,N2,N4 are normalization factors. Af-
ter Eve. knows the value of random phase ρ, she can take
a phase shift of e−iρ to every photon and obtain:
|ψ5〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉+ |2〉). (12)
Similarly, given the incident state |ψ′〉 in Step 1, we have
the following states for its time evolution at each stages:
|ψ′1〉 = N1
∞∑
k=1
(−√2µeiρ)k√
k!
|k〉; (13)
|ψ′2〉 = N2(−
√
2µeiρ|1〉+
√
2µe2iρ|2〉); (14)
|ψ′4〉 =
1√
2
(−|1〉+ eiρ|2〉) (15)
and
|ψ′5〉 =
1√
2
(−|1〉+ |2〉). (16)
A projective measurement can distinguish state |ψ5〉 and
state |ψ′5〉 deterministically. In the same way, one can
easily show that Eve. can also obtain full information of
bit values for those signal pairs if detector D1 counts.
V. CONCLUDING REMARK.
After the Eavesdropping above, Eve. has full infor-
mation of all raw bits. While to Alice and Bob, if they
go ahead to distill the final key using the decoy-state
method, they will find a key rate of 50% from raw key
to final key. In the Eavesdropping above, the fraction
of bits caused single-photon state is 50% among all raw
4bits. And in the scheme we have assumed the ideal con-
dition there is no error. According to key rate formula
(Eq.(2)) of Ref.[18], TF-QKD will present a key rate of
50% from raw key to final key. This means that the
existing form of TF-QKD protocol is not secure under
our designed Eavesdropping scheme we have presented
and the security of the existing TF-QKD is actually not
equivalent to that of the decoy-state MDI-QKD. There-
fore, the TF-QKD is supposed to be further studied in
the future to see whether its security can be improved
to a satisfactory level. For example, under the attack-
ing scheme we have proposed here, Alice and Bob use
many or two significantly different intensities for signal
pulse pairs could help to raise the security level. But
in such a case the security problem is not trivial. Eve
can have many other choices, e.g., she can intentionally
announce some wrong results. The security problem for
the TF-QKD also concludes that the 4-intensity opti-
mized protocol [13] of MDI-QKD is still the one that can
present the longest secure distance of QKD without us-
ing quantum memory on the Earth [15]. Obviously, using
the idea of our Eavesdropping scheme, there are lots of
refined variants. This will be reported later.
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